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1. Introduction
Virtually all criminal legislation is pervaded by the belief that punishment has a deterrent
effect on crime. This belief was strengthened by a study of Becker (1968) where, in an
economic model of crime, it was assumed that crime is a risky business and that people act
as rational utility maximizers. When a person considers all benefits and costs of a possible
crime, the expected utility of the crime will be reduced when either the probability of being
caught and punished or the severity of punishment is increased. Not surprisingly, a
reduction in the expected utility of crime will lead to a reduction in the number of crimes.
In the last 20 years the hypothesis of a deterrent effect of punishment has been
confirmed by several empirical studies of total crime and of various types of crime, but not
by all of them. (See reviews in Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin (1978), Heineke (1978),
Bleyleveld (1980), Schmidt and Witte (1984), and Cameron (1988)). Furthermore,
methodological problems in the common empirical studies of crime cast doubt on a
substantial part of this literature.
Most empirical studies are plagued by substantial underregistration of crime.
Registration depends on the attitude of those who discover a crime, on the access to
telephone, on insurance, on police routines, etc. If recording differs between police districts
(in cross section studies) or over the years (in time series studies), a spurious negative
correlation will appear between the crime rate and the proportion of crimes that are cleared
up (see e.g. Blumstein et al., 1978). If, on the other hand, an increase in the number of
policemen increases the number of crimes that are formally recorded, but not cleared up,
there will be a spurious negative correlation between the number of policemen and clear-up
proportion. Thus, underreporting and changes in recording will usually introduce a bias in
favour of deterrence, but against the hypothesis that the police produces it (Cameron 1988).
These spurious correlations impede the evaluation of criminometric studies, that most often
confirm that crime increases with a decrease in the clear-up proportion, but that more
police does not increase the clear-up proportion. This difficulty has inspired us to deal more
explicitly with measurement errors. Especially, we introduce latent variables and employ
the maximum likelihood method in estimating the structural relations of a simultaneous
model.
Fisher and Nagin (1978) have discussed the serious problem of identification of
models of crime. They are reluctant to accept the commonly used procedure in empirical
crime studies of identifying models by excluding various socioeconomic variables from the
equations. Using panel data we have succeeded in identifying our model by showing that
'Paper presented to the Econometric Society European Meeting in Maastricht, Aug. 29 - Sept. 2, 1994. A
version of this paper will be published in Eide (forthcoming).
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the structural parameters are explicit functions of the theoretical 2. order moments of the
log of the crime and clear-up rates.
When designing the model, we have emphasized simplicity in order to focus on
some basic theoretical and empirical issues. In particular, we have not included
sociodemographic variables explicitly. We include, however, latent police districts effects
which summarize the effects of socioeconomic variables on crimes and on clear-ups, and
we model the distributions of these latent variables across police districts and over time.
The strength of sentences is not included as a variable, because no perceptible difference
in this factor seems to exist between police districts and over time in the period studied.
This paper is a continuation of Aasness, Eide and Skjerpen (1992 and 1993). The
basic model is essentially the same, but it has been ameliorated on certain points, especially
in the more systematic treatment of hypotheses, cf Table 1 below. Whereas our 1992- and
1993-papers employed data on total crime only, we here study 12 different types of crime.
For the purpose of comparison, we have included the main results concerning total crime.
Section 6, the major empirical part of the paper, contains new results only.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the criminometric model is derived
by combining an equilibrium model of the latent number of crimes and clear-ups, based on
behavioural relations of the offenders and the police, and measurement relations allowing
for random and systematic measurement errors in the registered crimes and clear-ups.
Furthermore, submodels and hypotheses are classified. Section 3 presents detailed and
subtle identification results within this model class for panel data. Data and inference
procedures are presented in section 4, and empirical results using Norwegian data in section
5. In section 6 twelve types of crime are analysed in a similar manner. The main
conclusions are summarized in section 7.
2. Model framework and hypotheses
The criminometric model is designed to describe and explain crime and clear-up rates for
I (i=1,2,...I) police districts in T (t=1,2,...,T) years. Section 2.1 presents the equilibrium
model of crimes and clear-ups based on behavioural relations between the true latent
variables. The crime and clear-up tendencies of the police districts are discussed in section
2.2. In section 2.3 we introduce measurement relations connecting the true latent variables
with the observed crimes and clear-ups. The criminometric model in final form, derived
from the submodels in 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, is given in section 2.4, and in section 2.5 we define
submodels and present hypotheses to be tested. Note that the equations below hold for all
relevant i and t.
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2.1. An equilibrium model of crimes and clear-ups
The equilibrium model consists of the following three equations:
Pit = Yir -
X it = PitbCit,
Y it = X irtU it.
Xit is the (true) crime rate, i.e. the number of crimes per 1000 inhabitants, in police district
i in year t. Y it is the clear-up rate defined as the number of clear-ups per 1000 inhabitants.
Pit is the clear-up proportion defined in (la), i.e. the number of clear-ups as a share of the
number of crimes. (In the literature this concept (PO is sometimes denoted "clear-up rate",
while we prefer to use this term to denote the concept symbolized by Y i„ treating crimes
and clear-ups "symmetrically" throughout the analysis.)
The crime function (lb) says that the crime rate (Xit) is a simple power function of
the clear-up proportion (PO. It can be interpreted as a behavioural relation for an average
offender with rational expectations on the probability of being caught. Furthermore, it can
be derived from a utility maximizing model in the tradition of Becker (1968), keeping the
severity of punishment constant. For convenience we will call the parameter b the
deterrence elasticity and the variable Cit the crime tendency in police district i in year t.
The crime tendency (CO summarizes the effect of the socioeconomic environment and
other variables not explicitly modelled. The distribution of these latent crime tendencies
across districts and over time will be modelled below.
The clear-up function (lc) says that the clear-up rate (Yi) is a simple power
function of the crime rate (Xi). It can be interpreted as a behavioural relation of the police.
One may also interpret it as a combined relation of the behaviour of the police and the
political authorities financing the police force. For convenience we will call the parameter
r the clear-up elasticity, and the variable U it the clear-up tendency.
We will below interpret, exploit, and/or test the following hypotheses on the
deterrence elasticity (b) and the clear-up elasticity (r):
Hbo: b<0, fko: r>0, r<1, Hdo : dE.- .1+b(1-r)>0. (2)
The theory of Becker (1968) implies Hbo, and most empirical studies support this
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hypothesis'. The various weak aspects of the majority of these studies, however, require
further testing of the deterrent effect of the probability of sanctions. Hypothesis H e) seems
reasonable because more crimes make it possible to get more cases cleared up. With more
crimes, however, less police force would be available per case, thus Hrl seems plausible.
This hypothesis, too, is (indirectly) supported by several empirical studies, where the
probability of sanctions is found to be a decreasing function of the crime rate, see e.g.
Vandaele (1978). Restriction Hdo secures that there will exist a meaningful and stable
solution to our equilibrium model. (The significance of the sign of the "stability parameter"
d is discussed below.) Assuming H a , the restriction Hdo is equivalent to b>-1/(1-r), i.e. the
deterrence elasticity must not, for a fixed value of r, be too negative. Furthermore, from
Hbo, lid , and Hdo follows
Hdl 0<d<1.
The system of equations (1) has three endogenous variables (Pit, Xi, Y1J, and two
exogenous variables (Ci„ 14), with the following solution:
P= C (r-wduit	 it	 it
x it =	 udi T b/dit
Ytt = Cr/d 
(1 +b)/d
w
Assuming (2), we obtain clear-cut sign results in five out of six cases: Increased crime
tendency (C) decreases the clear-up proportion (Pi), increases the crime rate (Xit) and
increases the clear-up rate (Yi) • Increased clear-up tendency (U it) increases the clear-up
proportion (P), and reduces the crime rate (Xit), whereas the sign effect on the clear-up rate
depends on the magnitude of the deterrence effect:
Elu
 y it
 = (1 +b)szt:0 iff
	
(4)
Thus, if the deterrence elasticity is less than -1, an increased clear-up tendency (Ui) reduces
the number of clear-ups (Yit) due to the strong reduction in the number of crimes.
The question of stability of the equilibrium solution (3) can most easily be discussed
by help of Fig. 1, where the crime rate is measured along the horizontal axis, and the clear-
up proportion along the vertical one. (For convenience, the subscripts i and t are here
'See Eide (forthcoming) for a review.
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
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Px- XX1
dropped.) The crime curves illustrate relation (lb) when b<0. The crime control curves are
obtained by eliminating the clear-up rate through substitution of (1c) into (la):
Pit = 4_ 1 T Tit
U , or (lc')
1	 1
xit = pirt - 1 uit1 -r	 (lc")
Relation (lc') can be interpreted as the crime control function of the society (including the
police). The clear-up activity represented by (lc) has been transformed into a function
determining the clear-up probability (which again, in interaction with the crime function,
determines the equilibrium values of the model).
a) Stable, d>0	 (b) Unstable, RO
Fig. 1 Stability of equilibrium
In Fig. 1 we assume that there exist positive equilibrium values P. and and X* of
the clear-up proportions and crime rates, respectively, and that Hbo and H 	satisfied. In
Fig. 1 (a) the crime curve is steeper than the crime control curve, which means, cf (lb) and
(lc"), that 1/(r-1) < b , or 1+b(1-r) > 0, which is the same as restriction Hdo. Considering,
according to the correspondence-principle of Samuelson (1945), our equilibrium to be the
stationary solution to a corresponding dynamic model, where the society (including the
police) determines the clear-up probability (cf (lc')), and the potential offenders thereafter
determines the number of crimes (cf (lb)), the following mechanism is obtained: If we start
out with a hypothetical crime rate Xl, the society's crime control (cf (lc')) will result in
a clear-up rate Pl, a rate at which crime (cf (lb)) will be reduced to X2, which again will
result in a higher clear-up rate P2, etc. The crime rate and the clear-up proportion will
move towards the equilibrium solution. A similar move towards equilibrium will obtain if
we start from a crime rate below its equilibrium value. Thus, restriction d>0 is sufficient
for a stable equilibrium under the stated conditions. If d < 0, we have the situation in Fig.
1 (b). Here, the society's crime control activity will produce, from a hypothetical crime rate
X3, say, a clear-up proportion P3, that will result in a higher crime rate X4, which again
will produce a lower clear-up proportion P4, etc. The crime rate will explode. Starting with
any crime rate below X*, the clear-up proportion will increase and the crime rate decrease.
With our assumptions, we thus find that d>0 is also a necessary condition for the
equilibrium solution to be stable. (If d=0, the two curves merge, and no single equilibrium
solution is obtained.) It is straightforward to formally prove stability by analyzing an
appropriate difference equation.
2.2. Distribution of crime and clear-up tendencies
The model determines an equilibrium for each police district in every year. By specifying
a distribution on the crime and clear-up tendencies (Cit, Utt) across police districts, and how
it varies over time, we obtain a corresponding distribution of crimes and clear-ups (Xt„
through the reduced form model (3). Consider the following decomposition:
1nC1t
 = coot (on t( )20	 (5a)
lnUit Xot
	
tX2i,	 (5b)
where wo, and Xot are deterministic (police district
 invariant) time tends, and the remaining
ct)s and
 As are time invariant latent district effects. Stochastic specifications are given in
(15) below. The assumptions that the covariance matrices, of cos and As respectively, are
positive semidefinite can be stated as the following hypotheses:
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Hg,:
 4:740.40.A cr (02(02A a24)1(02 a witaia024022	 (6a)
111.: crlui4 131212A 43 1112 1:1 11103 127,2-
	 (6b)
These hypotheses will be discussed and tested below.
This structure allows for a restricted evolution over time in the distribution of the
crime and clear-up tendencies across police districts. In particular, it follows that
var inCit
 =  - (01( )1	 2taco1.02
	 t2a0)2(025	 (7a)
var Inuit
 = axixi 2tax1x2 eax2a2.
	
(7b)
Note that if 1nCit
 is assumed to be normally distributed, the coefficient of variation
of the crime tendency, VvarCit/ECit, will be a simple transformation of var 1nCit, cf
Aitchison and Brown (1957, p. 8). Thus, dropping the term ohi implies a constant
coefficient of variation of the crime tendency C.
From (7) it follows that
Avar 1nC1t
 = 2a(01,02 (2t+ 1)0.2.2,	 (8a)
Avar lnUit
 = 2ax,a2 (2t+1)Gx2x2,	 (8b)
where A denotes the first difference operator. From (8a) we see that the variance of the log
of the crime tendency decreases if and only if col co2 < 0'.2.2(2t+1)/2. Thus, a necessary
condition for this to happen, interpreting 00,2,02 as a positive variance, is that the covariance
between the two components col and co2 is negative.
It should be noted, however, that it is possible to give another interpretation of (7)
and (8) above. We may drop (5) and (6) and start with specifying (7). Then we may
interpret, say c;(02(02, just as a parameter in a relation which describes how var InCit evolves
over time. With such an interpretation it is meaningful to have a negative value of 0 2,
which implies a time trend towards decreasing spread in the crime tendencies across police
districts.
Observe further that our model allows for four different time trends in crime and
clear-up tendencies: i) monotonically increasing, ii) monotonically decreasing, iii) first
increasing and then decreasing, and iv) first decreasing and then increasing.
We consider the 2. order polynomial in (7a) to be a valid approximation only for
a limited time period. In particular, we are interested to test the hypotheses that the derived
variances of the crime and clear-up tendencies are positive for a set of time periods, i.e.
	var C>0, t=1,2,...,T,	 (9a)
Hu: var U 1>0, t=1,2,...,T.	 (9b)
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In our empirical test we shall interpret t=1,2,...,T as the sample period. It may happen that
our second order polynomial can make these variances negative for some years, not only
outside the sample period, but also within it.
It may occur happen that H. is not fulfilled, while H is valid, a result which is
connected with the interpretation above of (7). Both types of hypotheses will be tested in
our empirical analyses.
2.3. Measurement relations
Let xi, and y it be the logs of the registered crime and clear-up rates, respectively. These
are related to the true rates by the following equations:
)(it = inXit + et + e it,
yit = lnY,t + ft + (pa•
Here, exp(e) and exp(f) represent systematic, multiplicative measurement errors in exp(x i)
and exp(y i,), respectively. The terms ; and ft are police district invariant. They may,
however, change over time. They are both deterministic variables. The term ; takes account
of the problem of systematic underreporting (dark number) of crime. The variables e it and
(pit can be interpreted as random measurement errors. Stochastic specifications are given in
15).
The assumption that the covariance matrix of the measurement errors is positive
definite, can be stated as the following hypothesis:
H a >0 >0 a2 <a aw• ee 9 a 44 gi) et 44.
Note that the random measurement errors (e a and (pi) are allowed to be correlated. We
expect this correlation to be positive: If, in a police district, registration is particularly
sloppy, some crimes that elsewhere normally would have resulted in separate files, are only
informally recorded. As formal files, including eventual clear-ups, constitute the basis for
the production of statistics, both the registered numbers of crimes and the registered
number of clear-ups will be lower than in a similar police district with better registration
procedures. This underregistration results in a positive correlation between the random
measurement errors. The same will happen if some files are forgotten when statistics are
produced by the end of the year. We thus state the hypothesis
12
Ee it=E(pit=Eco li=a)2i=EX ii =EX.2i=0,
Eeft=a„, apft=avq), Ee itc1)
E032i1=0,01,01 ,
 E°321=a002(.02 , Ew1i°321=aw1to2 ,
Hmc : •30)>0.	 (12)
For convenience we define the following transformed variables:
Lt = lnXit + et , 	(13a)
= lnY it + ft,	 (13b)
nit	 Vit - Xit, 	(13c)
= too, + (l+b)et
 bfr,	 (13d)
kt = Xot ret + ft .	 (13e)
In (13a) we define the log of the latent crime rate (xit) as the sum of the log of the tue
crime rate (Xi) and the systematic measurement error (e). The log of the latent clear-up
rate (vit), and the log of the latent clear-up proportion (nit) are defined in (13b) and (13c).
The parameters at and kt are introduced in order to simplify the criminometric model below.
Note that a, and kt
 are composed of the deterministic time trends of (5) and (10). We do
not try to identify and estimate these components separately.
2.4. The criminometric model in final form
From (1), (5), (10), and (13) we can now derive the following criminometric model:
xit	 Xit	 Lit,
yit	 Vit 4-
nit = Vit - Xit,
zit = bic
	+
Wit = rXit kt Xii
(14a)
(14b)
(14c)
(14d)
(14e)
We consider (e it,	 oho
 li X2i) as a vector of exogenous, random variables
independently drawn from the same distribution, with the following first and second order
moments:
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EX2 =a	 EX22.=a	 EX X =amaw	 X2A.2'	 li 2i	 XiX2' (15d)
All other covariances between the exogenous variables (e,9, to, and X.) are assumed to be
zero. Note that the assumptions of (15a) are innocent because of the constant terms defined
in (5) and (10). The other assumptions are to some degree commented on above. In section
4 we will also exploit and discuss the assumption that the variables are multinormally
distributed.
2.5. Hypotheses and model specifications
We have in (2), (6), (9), (11), and (12) formulated various interval hypoteses about the
parameters of our model framework. These are restated in Table 1. On the basis of point
hypotheses about some of the parameters we have in Table 2 classified various models
within our model framework. The assumptions of the models correspond to some of the
hypotheses we are interested in testing, especially hypotheses about the correlation of
measurement errors, and about the distributions of latent police district effects. Each
assumption is given a label, and each model will be denoted by the corresponding
combination of labels. (See Aasness, Biorn, and Skjerpen (1993) for a similar framework.)
On the basis of the model classification of Table 2 it is possible to specify 2x4x4=32
different models defined by different assumptions in the M-, W- and L-dimensions, where
these dimensions refer to correlations of measurement errors (M), correlations of police
district effects on crimes (W), and correlations of police district effects on clear-ups (L).
All these specific models are estimated and/or tested in the empirical analysis. We could,
of course, introduce other specifications, e.g. time trends in the police district invariant
terms a, and k, but this is not carried
 out in the present analysis.
3. Identification
Identification of most of the submodels are proven by showing that the structural
parameters are explicit functions of the theoretical 2. order moments of the crime and clear-
up rates, cf Appendix B of Aasness, Eide and Skjerpen (1992). The results of our
investigation of identification are summarized in Table 3. Here Wi* (i=0,1,2,3) denotes
the same assumptions as Wi in Table 2, except that all parameters assumed to be free in
Table 2 now are assumed not to be zero. Lj* is defined similarly, and we have, for instance,
that Wl*LO corresponds to W1LO, the difference being that ac01.1 can be zero in the latter,
but not in the former. Table 3 thus contains a complete set of submodels of W3L3.
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Table 1
Interval hypotheses
Name Hypothesis 	 Explanation	 Eq.
of hyp.	 no.
Hbo 	b<0
Hip	 r>0
r<1
Hd0
	 da 1 +b(1-r)>0
Hd! 	 0<d<1
Ho) 	 a0)10)1 ?-°,
a(02402?..°
a20)1 (.02 -."'<a03 1 OA a(02(.02
0-2 <a aX1X1 X21.2
HT:	 var C>0, t=1,2,...,T
Hu
	var U>0, t=1,2,...,T
aei>0,
avp>0,
020<a„a(pg,
Negative deterrence elasticity	 2
Positive clear-up elasticity
Clear-ups increase proportionally less than
crimes
Requirement of stable solution to crime	 2
model
Derived from Hbo, Hfi , and Hdo.
Positive semidefinite covariance matrices	 6a
for district effects in crime
Positive semidefinite covariance matrices 	 6b
for district effects in clear-ups
Positive variances of crime tendencies for
all years in sample period
Positive variances of clear-up tendencies	 9b
for all years in the sample period
Positive definite covariance matrix of	 11
measurement errors
H MC	 Cre(p>0
	
Positively correlated measurement errors 	 12
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Table 2
Classification of hypotheses and modelsa
Assumptions with respect to correlations of measurement errors
Label Parameter restriction 	Interpretation
MO	 No correlation of measurement errors
Ml
	free	 Measurement errors correlated
Assumptions with respect to correlations of police district effects on crimes
Label Parameter restriction
	Interpretation
00)1,01	 aw2,02	 a01,02
WO	 0	 0	 0	 No district effect in crime
W1	 free	 0	 0	 Time invariant district effect in crime
W2	 free	 free	 0	 Trend in distribution of district effect in crime
W3 free	 free
	 free	 Time invariant and tend effects correlated
Assumptions with respect to correlations of police district effects on clear-ups
Label Parameter restriction
	Interpretation
ax.1x1	 ax2x2	 ax1x2
LO	 0	 O	 0	 No district effect in clear-ups
Li
	free	 0	 0	 Time invariant district effect in clear-up
L2	 free	 free
	 0	 Trend in distribution of district effect in clear-up
L3	 free	 free	 free	 Time invariant and trend effects correlated
a A model is specified by a combination of 3 labels: e.g. model MOW 1L1 is a model where there is no
correlation of measurement errors, and no trends in the police district effects on crimes and clear-ups.
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A particular problem arises in models W3*L3* and W2*L2*. Here identification of r (or
b) requires the solution of a second order equation in this parameter, and we will in general
have two different roots, corresponding to two observationally equivalent structures. The
model can nevertheless be identified if only one of the two solutions satisfy a priori
restrictions on the set of parameter values. The simplest case is to assume Ho, i.e. 0<d<1,
which can be derived from (2), since we have shown (Appendix B, Section B.10 of our
1992 paper) that only one of the two solutions can satisfy this restriction. If one is not
willing to use Hdl as a maintained assumption, for example because one is interested in
testing this hypothesis, or the hypothesis of b<0, there are still possibilities for
discriminating between the two observationally equivalent structures, combining a priori
and empirical information. We will give an example of this, which we will exploit in our
empirical analysis below.
Let ø be denote the vector of n=11 structural parameters in our model, and consider first
the following set:
0 1 ={ØE Rn ari?.0, a(p(p>0, 0205.0„099, var inCit?.0, var InUit>.0, t=1,2,...,T},	 (16a)
i.e. the parameter values are meaningful with respect to our interpretation with
measurement errors and variation in crime tendencies and clear-up tendencies across police
Table 3
Identification of submodels of W3L3ab
W3*	 W2*	 W1*	 WO*
L3*	 Identified if	 Identified
	 Identified	 Not identified'
assuming Hdi
or #A=1
L2*	 Identified
	 Identified if	 Identified	 Not identified'
assuming
 Hd!
or #A=1
Ll*	 Identified
	 Identified
	 Not identified'	 Not identified'
LO*	 Not identified'
	 Not identifiedd 	Not identifiedd 	Not identified
a See section 2.5 and Table 2 for definitions of models. The results hold for both MO and Ml.
b O.., Ow, and a
	 identified for W3L3 (and for all submodels).
b is identified.
d
 r is identified.
e If one of the 4 non-identified parameters is given a fixed value, the remaining ones are identified.
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districts. If, say, solution I belongs to 0 1 , while solution II does not, we can discriminate
between them, i.e. solution I identifies the structure.
It may happen that both solutions belong to ê 1 . Then we may want to consider further
restrictions, say
02=1 OE Rn I r>0, d>01, 	 (16b)
cf hypotheses Ito and Hdo in section 2.1. It turns out that (16b) is all we need in our
empirical analysis for total crime in section 5.
In section 6, analyzing various types of crime, we need further restrictions, and we apply
03={0ER° lb<1, r<2}.	 (16c)
These restrictions are somewhat more arbitrary, but the idea is the following. One may
imagine societies with a positive deterrence elasticity b and/or a clear-up elasticity larger
than 1, i.e. where hypotheses Hbo and ft., are not fulfilled. It seems incredible, however, if
these parameters are very high. We have in (16c) chosen limits that are 1 higher than those
on which Hbo and Ha are based. We denote the corresponding hypotheses Hbi and Ha.
Restriction (16c) is exploited in our empirical analysis in section 6.
Let /(3) denote the theoretical covariance matrix of the observed variables as a function
of the unknown parameters O of our model. Let
A = OE Rn II(0)=I} n e
for an arbitrary value of the covariance matrix where 0 is a set of parameters, say 01,
02, 03, or a combination of these. If, for a given model, the number of elements in A is
equal to one (#A=1), we consider the corresponding solution the only one that can be
accepted, conditional on the choice of O. The number of elements in A can depend on /,
and the question of identification of W3*L3* and W2*L2* thus involves empirical issues.
In the empirical analysis below we argue that only one of the two solutions of W3*L3* is
relevant in our case.
We have demonstrated (in Appendix B (Section B.9) of our 1992 paper) that, Wi*Lj * is
observationally equivalent to Wj*Li a
 for i*j and i,j=0,1,2,3. It is also shown, however, that
assuming Hd i
 for one such model, the symmetric one is unstable, i.e. d<0. That is, within
the set of two symmetric models {Wi*Lj*, Wj*Li*} i,j=1,2,3), we can identify the
correct model under assumption Hdl . Furthermore, the restrictions in (16) will in our
empirical analysis turn out to be sufficient to determine which of two "symmetric" models
is relevant or acceptable.
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The parameters ow aw, and (Tel, are identified for W3L3 as a whole. Six of the
submodels are completely identified. Identification of b is further obtained in the three first
models of the last column of Table 3, whereas identification of the remaining parameters
here requires one supplementary piece of information (e.g. fixing the value of one of them).
Similarly, r is identified in the three first models of the last- line, and here too one more
piece of information is necessary in order to identify the remaining parameters.
4. Data and estimation
The model is estimated by use of data on the number of crimes and clear-ups for 53 police
districts in Norway for the period 1970-78, (cf Statistics Norway, annual). Our main
reasons for choosing this period is the absence of substantial changes in legal rules or
registration practices. The effects on crime and crime registration of such changes being
difficult to model, it is convenient to study a period where these problems are negligible
or of minor importance. These data are transformed into crime rates and clear-up rates and
further into logs of these rates. Finally, the logs are used to calculate a covariance matrix
of the log numbers of crime and clear-up rates for the nine years. This covariance matrix
(see Appendix) is all the data we use in our econometric analysis of total crime.
Let S be this sample covariance matrix of our observed variables, and
F = in I 1( 3)
 I + tr(SE(13) -1) in I S I - 2T, (17)
where "tr" is the trace operator, i.e. the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix.
Minimization of F w.r.t.
 ø is equivalent to maximization of the likelihood function when
assuming that all the observed variables (i.e. the lnx's and lny's) are multinormally
distributed. (All the first order moments are used to estimate the constant terms a, and kr .)
We have used the computer program LISREL 7 by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1988) to perform
the numerical analysis.
A standard measure of the goodness of fit of the entire model in LISREL is GFI = 1 -
tr[(1-1 S - 021/tr[(r 1 S)2], where I is the identity matrix; GFI = 1 indicates perfect fit.
Standard asymptotic t-values and x2- statistics are utilized. We use a significance level of
0.01 as a standard in our test, but report also significance probabilities.
We will test a specific model 0 (the null hypothesis) against a more general model 1 (the
maintained hypothesis) by a likelihood ratio test. Let F0 and F 1 be the minimum of F under
model 0 and model 1, respectively, and let s be the difference in the number of parameters
of the two models. It can be shown that minus twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio
is equal to I(F0 - F 1 ), where I is the number of police districts. According to standard theory
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this statistic is approximately e distributed with s degrees of freedom. The e value for
each model, given in Table 4, is defined as IF°, which can be interpreted as the test statistic
above when the alternative hypothesis is an exactly identified model, giving a perfect fit
to the sample covariance matrix and accordingly F1=0. The test statistic I(F0 - F1) for an
arbitrary pair of models may thus be computed by simply subtracting the corresponding
pair of e values. The significance probability corresponding to the value of a test statistic,
i.e. the probability of getting a x2 value greater than the value actually obtained given that
the null hypothesis is true, is reported in Table 5.
LISREL 7 minimizes the function F without imposing any constraints on the admissible
values of the parameter vector O. Thus the LISREL estimate of a parameter which we
interpret as a variance, may well turn out to be negative. This may be considered as a
drawback of this computer program. However, if our model and its interpretation is correct,
the LISREL estimates should turn out to have the expected signs, apart from sampling
errors. Thus, if for a given model the estimates fulfill all the conditions in (16a), we will
take this as a confirmation that the model has passed an important test. This in fact
happened in our empirical analysis, both for total crime and for the 12 different types of
crime.
If one is unwilling to assume normality of the observed variables, the estimators derived
from minimizing F above can be labelled quasi maximum likelihood estimators. These
estimators will be consistent, but their efficiency and the properties of the test procedures
are not so obvious. A large literature on the robustness of these types of estimators and test
procedures for departure from normality prevails, see e.g. JOreskog and Sørbom (1988) for
an extensive list of references, with quite different results depending on the assumptions
and methods used. A recent and growing literature shows, however, that the estimators and
test statistics derived under normality assumptions within LISREL type of models retain
their asymptotic properties for wide departures from normality, exploiting assumptions on
independently distributed nonnormal latent variables, see e.g. Anderson and Amemiya
(1988), Amemiya and Anderson (1990), Browne (1987), and Browne and Shapiro (1988).
The assumption of normality can be tested by use of the (moment coefficient of)
skewness m3/4m2 and the (moment coefficient of) kurtosis m4/m22. In a normal distribution
the skewness is equal to zero, and the kurtosis is equal to three. Given that the distribution
is normal, the observed skewness and kurtosis are asymptotically independent, and can thus
be used for two asymptotically independent tests of normality. Skewness and kurtosis for
our samples have been calculated (by SPSS) for the crime and clear-up rates, and for their
logs, and are included in Tables A3-A8 of Appendix C in our 1992 paper. In 98% of all
samples of size 50 from a normal population we have that the absolute value of skewness
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is less than 0.787, and the value of kurtosis is within the interval [1.95, 4.88]. We find
that normality is rejected for the crime rate (Table A34) by the skewness test for all years,
and by the kurtosis test for two years. As for the clear-up rate (Table A5), normality is
rejected by both tests for all years. The log of crime rates (Table A7) passes the skewness
test for all years, but the kurtosis test for none, whereas the log of clear-up rates (Table A8)
passes the skewness test in three years, and the kurtosis test also in three years. Obviously,
a logarithmic specification of our model is to be preferred to a linear one. The values of
the observed kurtosis are low, indicating platykurtic or "flat" distributions. This departure
from normality is considered in the X2 tests below.
Another approach, based on an assumption of a multivariate elliptical distribution of the
observed variables, shows that the likelihood ratio statistics derived under normality are still
applicable, by rescaling the test statistics by a factor equal to the inverse of Mardia's
coefficient of relative multivariate kurtosis, see Shapiro and Browne (1987). In the present
data set of total crime this coefficient is 1.06. This supports our hypothesis that our
procedure is robust against deviations from normality, and we do not consider it necessary
here to study distributions more in detail.
5. Empirical results, total crime
5.1. Likelihood ratio tests
All 32 models classified in Table 2 have been fitted. Table 4 contains for all models the
degrees of freedom (df), the goodness of fit (GFI), and the likelihood ratio ,2 test statistic
for each model against a model with no restriction on the covariance matrix.
First, we have studied the presence of correlation of measurement errors by testing MO
against Ml. For all (16) possible combinations of maintained assumptions in the W- and
L-dimensions MO is rejected, even at a level of significance of 10-6
Table 5.1 presents significance probabilities for tests of each of the hypotheses in the
W-dimension against a more general hypothesis of the same dimension. These tests are
performed for each of the alternative maintained assumptions in the L-dimension. Table 5.2
contains similar tests of the L-dimension. From Tables 5.1 and 5.2 we conclude that the
hypotheses of WO, LO, W 1, and Ll are rejected. We have further found (not included in
3The critical values of skewness and kurtosis can be found in Pearson (1965). A discussion of the present tests
of normality is found in White and MacDonald (1980).
4The tables referred to in this paragraph are found in Aasness, Eide and Skjerpen (1992).
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Table 4
Overview of fitted models
Ml-modelsa
District	 District effects on crime
effects on
clear-ups	 W3	 W2	 W1	 WO
dl
	 160	 161	 162	 163C
L3	 X2	 291.25	 291.87	 304.69	 509.72
GFI	 0.641	 0.639	 0.632	 0392
dl
	
161	 162	 163	 164'
L2	 X2	 291.87	 305.11	 30932	 519.03
GFI	 0.639	 0.631	 0.628	 0386
dl
	 162	 163	 164C	 165'
Li
	 X2	 304.69	 30932	 415.35	 620.03
GFI	 0.632
	 0.628	 0.508	 0329
df	 163b	 164b	165e'	 166''
LO	 e 	 509.72	 519.03	 620.03	 1484.8
GFI	 0392	 0386	 0329	 0.185
MO-modelsa
District
	 District effects on crime
effects on
clear-ups
	 W3	 W2	 W1	 WO
df	 161	 162	 163	 164C
L3	 X2	 60037	 604.21	 604.28	 704.53
GFI
	 0.467	 0.460	 0.460	 0.428
dl
	 162	 163	 164	 165'
L2	 X2	 604.21	 622.64	 622.65	 717.73
GFI	 0.460	 0.458	 0.458	 0.424
df163	 164
	
165'	 166'
Li
	e	 604.28	 622.65	 742.98	 815.16
GFI	 0.460	 0.458	 0398	 0387
dl
	 164b	 165b	 166b	 167bc
LO
	X2	 704.53	 717.73	 815.16	 2055
GFI	 0.428	 0.424	 0387	 0.088
a See section 3 regarding the symmetry between WiLj and WjLi (i*j; i=0,1,2,3).
b The model is estimated for a fixed value of b, any b would give the same e.
The model is estimated for a fixed value of r, any r would give the same 2c2 .
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Table 5
Significance probabilities in likelihood ratio tests'
1. Tests of district effects on crimes
Maintained
	
Null and alternative hypotheses
assumptions	 WO against	 W1 against	 W2 against	 W1 against
W1	 W2	 W3	 W3
M1L3	 0.000000	 0.000451	 0.442419	 0.001581
M1L2	 0.000000	 0.049156	 0.000273	 0.000192
M1L1	 0.000000	 0.000000	 0.028295	 0.000000
M11,0	 0.000000	 0.000000	 0.002206	 0.000000
2. Tests of district effects on clear-ups
Maintained
	 Null and alternative hypotheses
assumptions	 LO against	 Li against	 L2 against	 Li against
Li
	 2
	 L3	 L3
M1W3	 0.000000	 0.000451	 0.442419	 0.001581
M1W2	 0.000000	 0.049156	 0.000273	 0.000192
M1W1
	 0.000000	 0.000000	 0.028295	 0.000000
M1W0
	 0.000000	 0.000000	 0.002206	 0.000000
a The equality of the significance probabilities between Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is due to the symmetry
between the models WiLj and WjLi, cf Table 4.
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Table 5) that WOLO is rejected against W1L1, W1L1 against W2L2, and W2L2 against
W3L3. This leaves us with the general model M1W3L3 and the two non-rejected models
M1W3L2 and M1W2L3. The choice between them can be made on the basis of parsimony,
and of the acceptability of the estimated parameters. It will be argued below that M1W3L2
is the model to be preferred.
5.2. Evaluation of models not rejected by likelihood ratio tests
As identification of certain parameters in some of our models depends on the solution of
a second order equation, there will in general exist two observationally equivalent
structures, and correspondingly two global minima to the fit function in (17). Depending
on the starting values, LISREL will find one or the other of these two solutions. The
second one, which has the same F-value as the first, can be located by choosing appropriate
starting values. This is done for the model M1W3L3, where we obtain the solutions I and
II, the parameter estimates of which are given in Table 6. Both solutions satisfy restriction
(16a), which then cannot distinguish between them.
The two solutions are further characterized in Fig. 2, where the minimum value of F is
plotted for various given values of r. The two global minima of F are obtained for those
F(r)
2.86
2.84
2.82
2.801
..	 I	 i 
	-0213 0
	 0.808 1
Fig. 2. F-values of M1W3L3 with two solutions
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values of r that correspond to the solutions I and II. As a check of our conclusions, the
minimum value of F has been calculated for a series of values of r in the interval [-200,
200]. F is decreasing for values of r to the left of the lower solution. For values of r higher
than 1.8, F is decreasing, but very slowly, and does not reach lower than 2.829 in the
interval studied. Solution II violates restrictions H,0 and Hdo, cf (16b), whereas all the
estimates in solution I seem sensible. Thus, we prefer solution I.
We observe that the estimates of M1W3L3 I and M1W3L3 11 are almost identical with
those of M1W3L2 and M1W2L3, respectively. Furthermore, from the estimates of b and
r we calculate the value of the stability parameter d to be 0.83 in M1W3L2 and -5.01 in
M1W2L3. Thus we prefer the former model to the latter, cf section 3. The final choice is
then between M1W3L3' and M1W3L2. Both models have rather similar estimates. The
latter being more parsimonious, we consider this model to be the (slightly) preferred one.
We focus on this model in sections 5.3 to 5.5, and discuss robustness of results across
models in section 5.6.
5.3. The deterrence and clear-up elasticities
The estimate of the deterrence elasticity (b) is significantly negative in our preferred model,
and close to -1. The estimate of the clear-up elasticity (r) is about 0.8 in the same model,
and the confidence interval is clearly within the boundaries argued a priori, cf (2). These
estimates of b and r imply that the estimate of the stability parameter d is 0.8, and the
corresponding confidence interval is clearly within the boundaries (0,1), in agreement with
our hypothesis Hdl .
5.4. Distribution of crime and clear-up tendencies
The estimates of the distribution parameters of the district effects on crime are also given
in Table 6. All three are statistically significant. Straightforward calculation shows that for
our preferred model the variance of the crime tendency, var 1nCit = coicoi	 t2acoao2
2tac01(02, is estimated to be positive for all years, i.e. for t=1,2,...,9. As this estimate is not
restricted to positive values by LISREL, we take the result as a confirmation that our
model, and our interpretation of it, has passed an interesting test.
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Table 6
Estimates of non-rejected modelsa b
Parameter M1W3L31
	 M1W3L2	 M1W2L3	 M1W3L311
b	 -0.824	 -0.850	 -5.107	 -5.157
(0.353)
	 (0.308)	 (2.144)	 (2.487)
0.810	 0.804	 -0.177	 -0.213
(0.094)	 (0.082)
	
(0.426)	 (0.519)
awl col
	 0.271	 0.268	 1.030	 1.145
(0.069)	 (0.065)	 (1.108)	 (1.402)
ao)2co2
	 0.0010	 0.0010	 0.0093	 0.0109
(0.0004)	 (0.0003)	 (0.0092)	 (0.0125)
°col co2
	
-0.0095	 -0.0094	 OC	 -0.0194
(0.0037)	 (0.0035)	 (0.0364)
°Al X1
	 0.043
	 0.040	 0.371	 0.398
(0.015)
	 (0.013)	 (0.323)	 (0.407)
aX2Ä2
	 0.0004	 0.0004	 0.0013	 0.0014
(0.0002)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0016)
°XI X2
	
-0.0007	 Oc	 -0.0131	 -0.0139
(0.0010)	 (0.0115)	 (0.0145)
Gee
	 0.028	 0.028
	 0.028	 0.028
(0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)
0.066	 0.066	 0.066	 0.066
(0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
a.„	 0.032	 0.033	 0.033
	
0.032
(0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)
d
	
0.843
	 0.833	 -5.011	 -5.255
(0.044)	 (0.045)	 (1.609)	 (1.725)
a See Table 2 for definitions of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a second order
equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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We note that (5. 1.2 is significantly negative. Furthermore, the estimates indicate a
decrease in the variance of the log of the district effects over time. Denoting the first
difference operator by A, we see in fact that Avar 1nC it = (2t+1)0 2 + 20. 102 is negative
for the whole period. The estimate of var 1nC1t is, in this period, reduced from 0.250 to
0.171. The estimate of the variance of the log of the crime tendency is thus substantially
reduced during the period.
The estimates of the distribution parameters of the district effects on clear-ups (ax1x1 and
ax2x2) are positive, and significantly different from zero in our preferred model. The
variance of the clear-up tendency is increasing during the period from 0.040 to 0.072.
The distribution parameters	 and aui (i=1,2) are all positive, and interpreting these
parameters as variances we find that our model has passed another interesting test.
5.5. Measurement errors
The estimates of the variances and the covariance of the errors of measurement are positive
and highly significant. This confirms our hypothesis in section 2.3 of a positive GeV Also
note that the covariance matrix of the measurement errors (cf section 6.3) is positive
definite.
5.6. Robustness of results
Table 7 shows the estimates of all models with two global maxima (solutions I and II). We
observe that for all four solutions 11 the estimates of both r and d are negative. These
models are thus rejected according to (16b).
Table 8 contains the estimates of all identified Mi-models (solutions II not included).
The MO-models are strongly rejected against the corresponding Ml-models (details on the
MO-models are given in our 1992 paper). Just like in our preferred model, the estimate of
b is found to be negative in all but two of the models in Table 8. The two models in
question, M1W2L1 and M1W3L1 have not significant estimates of b. They are strongly
rejected by the likelihood ratio tests, and have some quite nonsensical estimates. Thus, we
do not give them weight as evidence on b. We conclude that the estimated sign of b is
robust across models, although the value varies substantially. This result suggests that
misspecification in modelling may not hinder the sign of the deterrence elasticity to be
correctly determined, but that a reliable estimate of its valiie requires thorough empirical
analysis.
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Table 7
Estimates of models with two global maxima'
Para-
meter	 M1W3L3I M1W3L3 ll M1W2L2I M1W2L2ll MOW3L3 I M0W3L3 11 MOW2L2 I MOW2L211
-0.824	 -5.157	 -0.890
	 -4.436	 -.920	 -4.892	 -0.137	 -6312
(0353)	 (2.487)	 (0541)	 (2356)	 (0.296)	 (1.591)	 (1.028)	 (1.060)
r	 0.810	 -0.213	 0.775	 -0.124	 0.796	 -0.087	 0.715	 -3503
(0.094)	 (0519)	 (0.120)	 (0.684)	 (0.067)	 (0350)	 (0.086)	 (54.9)
0.1col	 0.271	 1.145	 0.221	 0.725	 0.271	 0.455	 0375	 0.434
(0.069)	 (1.402)	 (0.079)	 (1.010)	 (0.063)	 (0559)	 (0.240)	 (0.301)
0.2.2	 0.0010	 0.0109	 0.0007	 0.0072	 0.0014	 -0.0066	 0.0017	 -0.0002
(0.0004)	 (0.0125)
	 (0.0004)
	 (0.0086)	 (0.0003)	 (0.0046)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0020)
0,0 ,02
	-0.0095
	 -0.0194	 Oc	 OC	 -0.0114	 0.0649	 OC	 OC
(0.0037)
	 (0.0364)
	 (0.0034)	 (0.0422)
oxim
	
0.043	 0.398	 0.037	 0.279	 0.0190	 0320	 0.0354	 20
(0.0148)
	 (0.407)	 (0.014)	 (0.425)
	 (0.0137)	 (0.249)	 (0.0095)	 (313)
Cl 2A.2	 0.0004	 0.0014	 0.0004	 0.0008	 -0.0003	 0.0016	 -0.0000	 0.089
(0.0002)	 (0.0016)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0015)	 (0.0002)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0002)	 (1392)
ax1x2	 -0.0007	 -0.0139	 Oc	 0`	 0.0027	 -0.0134	 OC	 OC
(0.0010)	 (0.0145)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0094)
as.	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.027	 0.027
(0.002)
	 (0.002)
	 (0.002)
	 (0.002)
	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)
aqxp	 0.066	 0.066	 0.067	 0.067	 0.064	 0.064	 0.064	 0.064
(0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
as,	 0.032	 0.032	 0.033
	 0.033	 OC	 Oc	 OC	 OC
(0.003)
	 (0.003)
	 (0.003)
	 (0.003)
d	 0.843
	 -5.255	 0.800
	 -3.986	 0.812	 -4318	 0.961	 -27.4
a See Table 2 for definitions of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a second order
equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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Table 8
Estimates of Ml-modelsab
Para-	 M1W3L3 M1W3L2 M1W3L1 M1W2L3 M1W2L2 M1W2L1 M1W1L3 M1W1L2
meter
b	 -0.824	 -0.850	 1.764	 -5.107	 -0.890	 230	 -2.122	 -1.677
(0.353)	 (0.308)	 (2517)	 (2.144)	 (0.541)	 (8815)	 (0.447)	 (0.273)
r	 0.810	 0.804	 0.529
	 -0.177	 0.775	 0.404	 1.567	 1.004
(0.094)	 (0.082)	 (0.099)	 (0.426)	 (0.120)	 (0.097)	 (0.809)	 (0.167)
acolcol
	
0.271	 0.268	 1.142	 1.030	 0.221	 4201	 0.199	 0.170
(0.069)	 (0.065)	 (1.508)	 (1.108)	 (0.079)	 (319619)	 (0.063)	 (0.036)
0.20)2	 0.0010	 0.0010	 0.0056	 0.0093	 0.0007	 27.0	 OC	 OC
(0.0004)	 (0.0003)	 (0.0079)	 (0.0092)	 (0.0004)	 (2055)
cs,,,, a„	 -0.0095	 -0.0094	 -0.0308	 OC	 OC	 OC	 OC	 Oc
(0.0037)
	 (0.0035)	 (0.0446)
ax1,1	 0.043	 0.040	 0.044	 0.371	 0.037	 0.060	 0.367	 0.079
(0.0148)
	 (0.013)	 (0.013)	 (0323)	 (0.014)	 (0.023)	 (0.573)	 (0.048)
ax2x2	 0.0004	 0.0004	 OC	 0.0013	 0.0004	 OC	 0.0018	 0.0005
(0.0002)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0027)	 (0.0002)
a1 1k2	 -0.0007	 Oc	 OC	 -0.0131	 Oc	 OC	 -0.0099	 OC
(0.0010)
	 (0.0115)	 (0.0152)
a..	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.028	 0.029	 0.028	 0.029
(0.002)
	 (0.002)
	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)
lu,q,	 0.066	 0.066	 0.070	 0.066	 0.067	 0.071	 0.070	 0.071
(0.005)	 (0.005)
	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
a1
	0.033	 0.034	 0.033	 0.033	 0.035	 0.034	 0.035
(0.003)	 (0.003)
	 (0.003)
	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)
d	 0.843	 0.833
	 1.831
	 -5.011	 0.800	 138	 2.203	 1.007
a See Table 2 for definitions of models. Only solutions I are included ., see Table 6 for solutions II.
Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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The estimate of r is, as expected, and just as in our preferred model, located in the
interval [0,1] for the six models where the estimate is significant. The estimate is negative
in M1W2L3. According to Table 5, M1W2L3 is not rejected against M1W3L3. We
nevertheless disregard the former model, because the estimated value of d is significantly
negative, and because its symmetric counterpart M1W3L2 is perfectly acceptable. Thus,
none of the more interesting models have estimates of r that are outside the assumed
interval
For all models the variance of the crime tendency (var 1nC ij is found to be positive in
all years. We note that a0,10,2 is significantly negative for the fitted models where this
parameter is not zero a priori (i.e. for the W3-models). Furthermore, the estimates indicate
a decrease in the variance of the district effects over time for most models.
The estimates of the variances of the district effects on clear-ups (ax1x1 and ax2x2) are
positive in all models.
The estimates of the variances and the covariance of the errors of measurement are very
robust with respect to model specifications.
6. Empirical results, various types of crime
6.1. Overview of procedure
Our model framework has been applied to 12 different types of crime. In section 6.2 we
present estimates of the general model W3L3 (solution I) for each of the 12 specific types
of crime. In section 6.3 we test for each type of crime the various models within our
framework. In particular, we give an empirical investigation of properties related to
problems of identification. The estimates for each type of crime, in models not rejected by
various criteria, are given in section 6.4. It will be seen that the estimates of most of these
models are not very different from those of our general model W3L3 (solution I), which
is one reason for presenting the results of the latter model first. We find, however, that for
some types of crime there are models more parsimonious than W3L3 that tum out to
perform well, whereas some of the rejected models give unreasonable or meaningless
results. These results underscores the importance of using a model framework with a class
of models, instead of sticking to one particular specification.
Unpublished data from Statistics Norway, which we have used in this study, contains a
rather detailed categorization of crime. In order not to have too few observations in some
police districts we have chosen to study only those types of offence numbering more than
500 for the whole country in at least some of the years. The following types of crime,
which account for more than 95 percent of the total number of crimes, meet this
30
requirement (the numbers being those used to categorize the types of crime in the official
crime statistics):
13 Public disorder (incl. burglary).
18 Forgery.
19 Sexual offence.
21 Offence against the personal liberty.
22 Offence of violence against the person.
23 Slander and libel.
24 Embezzlement.
26 Fraud and breach of trust.
28 Offence inflicting damage to property.
40 Aggravated larcenies.
41 Simple larcenies.
43 Theft of motor vehicles.
Our general model has been applied to the 12 different types of crime with data for the
period 1972-78. At variance with the study of total crime, data on specific types of crime
are not available for the years 1970 and 1971. The covariance matrices of the logs of the
crime and clear-up rates for each type of crime are included in the Appendix, Because of
the log specification, zero values are treated as missing values. Missing values are then
handled by listwise deletion: if data from a police district is missing in one or more years,
this district is excluded from the calculation of the covariance matrix of the observed
variables.
6.2. Estimates of the general model W3L3
The estimates of our most general model W3L3 are given in Table 11. These are the
estimates of solution I, cf section 3 and 5.2. Our analysis which discriminates between
solutions I and II is presented in section 6.3, and estimates for both solutions are given in
section 6.4.
6.2.1. The deterrence and clear-up elasticities
According to our discussion of rational behaviour in previous chapters we hypothesize that
the deterrence elasticity b is negative also for each specific type of offence, even for so-
called "expressive crimes", such as sexual abuses, where a precise calculation of costs and
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benefits hardly is the rule. We find it natural to test whether a lower probability of
detection will increase crime also in this case.
The deterrence elasticity (b) is found to be negative for seven of the 12 types of crime,
and significantly so in four cases. None of the positive estimates are statistically significant.
Thus, we find that Hbo, cf Table 1, is not rejected against the alternative hypothesis b>0,
whereas the latter is rejected against the former in a majority of cases. We conclude that
our results give rather strong support to H. As one would expect, some of the estimates
are higher than the corresponding one obtained for all crimes taken together, and some are
lower.
We further expect the clear-up elasticity r to be positive, although one might imagine that
the police in certain situations has to use such an amount of their resources on recording
an increase in crime that the number of those cleared up will decrease.
The estimate of the clear-up elasticity (r) is positive in all cases, and significantly so in
11 of them. Our hypothesis H not rejected against the alternative hypothesis r<O,
whereas the latter is rejected against the former. We thus conclude that I-1,0 is strongly
supported.
In contrast to our expectation in the case of total crime we do not exclude r>1 for some
types of crime. For a single type of crime the number of clear-ups might increase
proportionally more than the number of crimes because the police becomes more efficient
in clearing up certain crimes when they are "trained" in solving many cases of a similar
type. Within some police districts resources might also be reallocated in order to solve
specific types of crime that attract public interest, thus producing a proportionally larger
increase in clear-ups than in crimes.
For six types of crime the clear-up elasticity is higher than 1. In most of these cases,
however, the estimate of r is less than about one standard error higher than 1. This means
that HT, is not rejected against the alternative hypothesis r> 1 , whereas the latter also is not
rejected against the former.
Hypothesis Hdo of a positive value of the stability parameter d implies that the system of
equations have a stable solution. The stability parameter is found to be positive for an types
of crime.
6.22. Distribution of crime and clear-up tendencies
Hypotheses 1-10., and fix
 implies that we interpret the parameters of these hypotheses as
variances and covariances. The estimates of the distribution parameters of the district
effects on crime (ici,
 010)202, and am(02) and on clear-ups (a),1x1 , ax2x2, and ax1x2) are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level according to the t-test in 10, 5, 3, 4, 3, and 2 cases,
respectively. In all these cases, but one, the sign of the estimates of the variances is in
accordance with the hypotheses. The condition a2 12 a coiwiaco2c02 in 11,0 is fulfilled for all
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types of crime, except forgery, sexual offence, slander and label, and offence against
personal liberty. The analogous condition in fix is fulfilled for all types of crime, except
forgery, embezzlement and fraud. In both cases these exceptions are obtained from non-
significant estimates of variances and covariances.
Hypotheses fic and Hu state that the variances of the log of the crime and clear-up
tendencies are positive. These variances, as well as those in the previous paragraph, are not
restricted to positive values by LISREL, cf section 4. Straightforward calculation, using
these estimates whether they are significant or not, shows that the variance of the log of
the crime tendency, var 1nC it = CF mica + t20.2.2 + 2ta01(02, is positive for all years, i.e. for
t=1,2,...,7, for all types of crime, see Table 12. The same holds true for the variance of the
log of the clear-up tendency var lnUit, except for an insignificant negative estimate in the
first year in the case of embezzlement. Thus, we consider hypoteses Fic and Hu not to be
rejected in any of the cases. We take this result as a confirmation that our model
framework, and our interpretation of it, has passed another interesting test (in addition to
the analogous one for the total number of crimes).
The variance of the log of the crime tendency is decreasing during the period studied for
all types of crime, except public disorder, embezzlement, fraud, and slander and libel. In
the former three cases there is first a decrease and then an increase, whereas in the latter
case there is a steady increase. As a whole there is a general tendency for police districts
to become less different as far as crime tendencies are concerned. This is in a relative
sense, since the variance of the log of the crime tendency corresponds to the coefficient of
variation of the crime tendency, cf comments to (7) in section 2.2.
The variance of the clear-up tendencies develops less uniformly across types of crime.
It is
a) increasing for offence against personal liberty, violence against the person,
embezzlement, aggravated larcenies, simple larcenies, and thefts of motor vehicles,
b) decreasing for public disorder, slander and libel, and fraud,
c) decreasing and then increasing for sexual abuses and offence inflicting damage to
property, and
d) increasing and then decreasing for forgery.
6.23. Measurement errors
The estimates of the variances and the covariance of the errors of measurement are all
positive and highly significant. We find that hypotheses 1-114 and Hmc are not rejected in any
of the cases. Hypothesis Hm
 states that the covariance matrix of the measurement errors is
positive definite. Hypothesis Hmc
 is explained as a result of sloppy registration procedures:
for some of the crimes committed the registration of both crimes and clear-ups are lost in
the administrative process.
33
Table 11
Estimates of the general model (W3L3I)a for various types of crime
Para-	 All	 Public	 Forgery	 Sexual	 Offence	 Violence	 Slander
meter	 offence	 disorder	 offence	 against	 against the	 and libel
personal	 person
liberty
13	 18	 19	 21	 22	 23
b	 -0.824	 0.040	 0.048	 -0397	 -3.748	 -1.060	 0.883
(0353)	 (0.435)	 (0.660)	 (0.241)	 (1.718)	 (0.593)	 (0.485)
0.806	 0.670	 1.018	 0.870	 1.466	 1.072	 0.714
(0.094)	 (0.122)	 (0.098)
	 (0.199)	 (0379)	 (0.067)	 (0.244)
aœiœi 	0.2707	 0.5256	 0.2469	 0.1939
(0.0693)	 (0.2015)	 (0.1015)	 (0.0839)
1.1520
(1.0205)
0.2861	 0.1515
(0.0751)	 (0.1235)
aco2m2	 0.0010	 0.0075	 -0.0016	 -0.0002	 0.0011	 0.0016	 -0.0014
(0.0004)	 (0.0034)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0019)	 (0.0127)	 (0.0011)	 (0.0038)
0.1.2	 -0.0095	 -0.0386	 -0.0051	 -0.0038	 -0.0755	 -0.0113	 0.0240
(0.0037)	 (0.0196)	 (0.0123)
	 (0.0109)	 (0.1031)	 (0.0073)	 (0.0216)
okod	 0.0430	 0.2387	 0.0024	 0.1682	 0.0953	 0.0213	 0.2909
(0.0148)	 (0.0901)	 (0.0132)	 (0.0633)	 (0.1310)	 (0.0081)	 (0.1324)
GX2X2	 0.0004	 0.0038	 -0.0010	 0.0055	 0.0013	 0.0008	 0 0039
(0.0002)	 (0.0028)	 (0.0005)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0003)	 (0.0022)
Gam	 -0.0007	 -0.0282	 0.0047	 -0.0219	 0.0032	 -0.0021	 -0.0260
(0.0010)	 (0.0149)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0076)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0159)
(YEE 	0.028	 0.138	 0.363	 0.198	 0.188
(0.002)	 (0.013)	 (0.027)	 (0.021)	 (0.024)
0.079	 0.177
(0.007)	 (0.022)
a 0.066	 0.349	 0344	 0345	 0.251	 0.117	 0.290
(0.005)	 (0.033)
	 (0.035)
	 (0.036)	 (0.032)	 (0.010)	 (0.037)
Cro
	0.033	 0.118	 0.267	 0.206
(0.003)	 (0.016)	 (0.029)	 (0.024)
d	 0.840
	 1.013
	 0.999	 0.952
0.151	 0.085	 0.121
(0.024)	 (0.008)	 (0.023)
2.747	 1.076
	
1.253
X2 	 91.87	 155.27	 15236	 138.21	 179.22	 240.17	 123.04
GF!	 0.639	 0.676	 0.699	 0.682	 0.549	 0.594	 0.649
P	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000	 0.000	 0.024
No.`	 53	 39	 38	 38	 25	 53	 26
(Cont.)
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Table 1 i (cont.)
Estimates of the general model (W3L3 I)a for various types of crime
Para-	 All	 Embezzle- Fraud	 Offence	 Aggravated Simple	 Thefts of
meter	 offence	 ment	 inflicting	 larcenies	 larcenies	 motor
damage to	 vehicles
property
24	 26	 28	 40	 41	 43
b	 -0.824	 0.055	 0.200	 -0.502	 -2.437	 -1.072	 -2.679
(0353)	 (0.629)	 (0.758)	 (0.930)	 (0.566)	 (0.193)	 (0.472)
0.806	 0.902	 0.962	 0.901	 1.420	 1.132	 1.608
(0.094)	 (0.070)	 (0.046)	 (0.442)	 (0.419)	 (0.257)	 (0.934)
acolcol	 0.2707	 0.3121	 0.5249	 03426	 0.7338	 03362	 0.7264
(0.0693)	 (0.1269)	 (0.141)	 (0.1041)	 (03530)	 (0.0945)	 (0.2054)
am2co2	 0.0010	 0.0102	 0.0075	 0.0067	 0.0048	 0.0037	 0.0019
(0.0004)	 (0.0049)	 (0.0030)	 (0.0026)	 (0.0051)	 (0.0016)	 (0.0038)
0E016,2	 -0.0095	 -0.0355	 -0.0349	 -0.0350	 -0.0463	 -0.0300	 -0.0233
(0.0037)
	 (0.0214)	 (0.0172)	 (0.0135)	 (0.0388)	 (0.0111)	 (0.0229)
G3L1Ä,1	 0.0430	 -0.0113	 0.0223	 0.1413	 03665	 0.2891	 0.7138
(0.0148)	 (0.0116)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0782)	 (0.3960)	 (0.1667)	 (13772)
Ch.212	 0.0004	 0.0001	 -0.0006	 0.0036	 0.0012	 0.0032	 0.0041
(0.0002)	 (0.0007)
	 (0.0004)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0015)	 (0.0020)	 (0.0078)
axix2	 -0.0007	 0.0038	 0.0006	 -0.0155	 -0.0006	 -0.0087	 -0.0094
(0.0010)
	 (0.0025)
	 (0.0023)	 (0.0096)	 (0.0057)	 (0.0088)	 (0.0216)
au 	0.028	 0.232	 0.194	 0.096	 0.054	 0.049	 0.070
(0.002)	 (0.026)	 (0.018)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.006)
as
	0.066	 0.272	 0.291	 0.163	 0.198	 0.122	 0.134
(0.005)	 (0.030)
	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.017)	 (0.011)	 (0.012)
OE.	 0.032	 0.215	 0.210	 0.087	 0.071	 0.044	 0.074
(0.003)	 (0.026)	 (0.021)	 (0.010)	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)
d	 0.840	 0.995	 0.992	 0.960	 2.022	 1.142	 2.629
X2 	 91.25	 141.49	 184.22	 172.42	 181.24	 166.43	 155.06
GFI	 0.641	 0.641	 0.674	 0.684	 0.670	 0.724	 0.682
P	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
No.'	 53	 33	 47	 51	 53	 52	 51
a See Table 2 for definition of the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
C
 Number of police districts after listwise deletion of missing values.
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6.2.4. Summing up on the W3L3 model
We may thus conclude that solution I of the W3L3 model performs more or less equally
well for specific types of crime as for total crime. The estimates have in a large majority
of cases the expected signs. The only exceptions are the positive (non-significant) estimates
of the deterrence elasticity b for public disorder, slander and libel, forgery, embezzlement,
and fraud. (In the next section it will be seen that more parsimonious models give negative
estimates of b for the latter three types of crime.)
The change in the variance of the log of the crime tendencies demonstrates a reduction
in the relative differences in crime between police districts. The variance of the log of the
clear-up tendencies develops differently across types of crime. For nine of the 12 types,
however, the variance is higher at the end of the period than at the beginning.
6.3. Tests of model specifications
In order to test various model specifications we present in Table 13 the 2(2-values for
various models and in Table 14 the corresponding significance probabilities. Our model
framework consists now of a hierarchy of models with W3L3 on the top and W1L1 at the
bottom. We have dropped all models with either MO, LO or WO in our analysis of different
types of crimes in order to save time and space, cf Tables 2-4. Testing of models within
this framework by likelihood ratio tests can be performed in various ways. The simplest
procedure is to test each model against the general model W3L3. The significance
probabilities corresponding to these tests are presented in the first five columns in Table
14. Models rejected by these tests, at a signficance level of 0.01 and 0.05, are marked in
Table 15 by R0 • 01 and R0. 05, respectively.
Another procedure is to start at the top and test each model against the one immediately
higher in the hierachy, and if a model is rejected, then all models below in the hierachy are
also rejected. Significance probabilities corresponding to such tests can also be found in
Table 14. The test results in Table 15 will in our case be the same for both procedures.
Other procedures, and other levels of significance, can be applied based on the information
in Table 13, but in the following we stick to the test results presented in Table 15. In order
to limit our analysis we will give no further consideration of models rejected at a
significance level of 0.05.
Since our class of models is not fully identified without restrictions in the parameter
space, we also reject models which do not satisfy the restrictions in (16), see section 3. It
turns out that restrictions (16a) on the distribution of measurement errors, crime tendencies,
and clear-up tendencies, are not binding for any of the models not rejected by the
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likelihood ratio test. The models with point estimates outside the interval hypotheses in
(16b) and (16c) are marked in Table 15 with the names of the hypotheses they contradict,
cf Table 1.
Observe first that for each type of crime, one of the solutions of W3L3 is rejected by at
least one of our criteria, whereas the other is not. This is a remarkable result, since we
could well imagine that both solutions were rejected, or none of them. Thus, in our
situation, the identification problem does not seem to be empirically relevant. The solution
that is not rejected is denoted solution I, the other solution II. The parameter estimates of
both solutions are presented in Tables 17-27. It is seen that the estimates of solution II
almost without exceptions are unprecise and rather unreasonable. Our choice of restrictions
has clearly separated the appropriate solutions from the non-appropriate ones.
Considering now the less general models in Table 15 we find that quite a few of them
satisfy all our criteria. The estimates of these non-rejected models are given in Tables 17-
27, and the variances of the crime and clear-up tendencies are given in Table 16. In these
tables we find the estimates demonstrating our observation above that the non-rejected
models satify (16).
In order not to burden our presentation we have not included the estimates of the rejected
models. Our inspection of these have shown, however, that almost all of them perform
badly as far as precision and plausibility of estimates are concerned. Thus, our rejection
criteria (16) seem to perform quite well. We have further observed that the estimates of
these models to a large extent ressemble those of W3L3 11 .
The models that meet all our criteria will on the other hand have estimates rather similar
to those of W3L3 I. For each type of crime parsimony of parameters may guide our choice
of model within the group of these reasonable ones.
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6.4. Estimates for various types of crime
In this section we present estimates of the models that satisfy restrictions (16).
6.4.1. Public disorder
Most offence within the category of "offence against public order and peace" (here called
"public disorder") are burglaries. Table 15 shows that all submodels are rejected against
W3L3 by likelihood ratio tests, and that W3L3 I1 is rejected by H. The estimates of the two
W3L3 solutions are given in Table 17. One observes that several of the estimates of
W3L3 11 are unreasonable and do not satisfy (16). The estimates of W3L3 I are mostly
statistically significant with expected signs. An exception is the estimate of the deterrence
elasticity, which is positive and not statistically significant. There is a decline in the
variance of the crime tendency (see Table 12), suggesting a reduction in the differences
between police districts for this type of crime. The variance of the log of the clear-up
tendency is also decreasing during the period.
Looking at the number of crimes in the various police districts (data not included in this
paper) one is surprised to observe how few instances of public disorder are registered in
the capital compared to other police districts. One might suspect that in Oslo, and perhaps
in other districts, burglaries are not recorded as public disorder. Apparently, there are
special problems of recording for this type of crime.
6.42. Forgery
In the case of forgery, the estimates of the five models which satisfy the likelihood ratio
test, Hdo, and 1-1,0 are given in Table 18. The estimates of these models are rather similar
to each other. The clear-up elasticity r is found to be slightly higher than 1 for all these
models. The only notable difference between our general model and the other models is
that b is positive in the former and negative in the remaining ones (none of them
significant). Our desire for parsimony of parameters points at W2L1 as a good model for
forgery. In the case of forgery, too, we note a decrease in the variance of the crime
tendency during the period, indicating a shrinking relative difference between police
districts in this respect. The clear-up tendency is constant by definition.
6.43. Sexual offence
In the case of sexual offence we have three models that are not rejected by the likelihood
ratio test, and that also satisfy our restrictions (16). Their estimates are almost identical, see
Table 19. With few exceptions the estimates are statistically significant and of expected
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Table 17
Public disorder (incl. burglary) 13,
estimates of non-rejected modelsab
Parameter	 W3L31	 W3L311
b
	 0.040	 -3.026
(0.435)	 (1.112)
0.670	 26.267
(0.122)	 (277.4)
acolag
	 0.5256	 2.1856
(0.2015)	 (1.7758)
45 ,1)202
	 0.0075	 -0.035
(0.0034)	 (0.0362)
amica2
	
-0.0386	 -0.258
(0.0196)	 (0.2301)
0.2387	 335.54
(0.0901)	 (7272.5)
aX2Ä2
	 0.0038	 4.776
(0.0028)	 (103.5)
CYX1X2	 -0.0282	 -24.12
(0.0149)	 (534.2)
GEE
	 0.138	 0.138
(0.013)	 (0.013)
as 	 0.349	 0.349
(0.033)	 (0.033)
0.118	 0.118
(0.016)	 (0.016)
d	 1.013	 77.9
X2 	155.27	 155.27
GFI	 0.676	 0.676
P	 0.000	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I
and II correspond to the two solutions of a second
order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
45
W3L1	 W2L21	 W2L1
-0.359	 -0.899	 -0.454
(1.557)	 (3.912)	 (1.65)
1.048	 1.106	 1.058
(0.165)	 (0.430)	 (0.177)
0.2493	 0.2339	 0.2184
(0.1106)	 (0.1916)	 (0.0704)
-0.0017	 -0.0026	 -0.0024
(0.0021)	 (0.0026)	 (0.0013)
0.0049	oc	 0'
(0.0126)
0.0198
(0.0073)
Oc
0.263
(0.027)
0.341
(0.034)
0.266
(0.029)
1.017
155.64
0.683
0.000
0.0245	 0.0200
(0.0208)	 (0.0077)
-0.0002	 0'
(0.0004)
Oc	 0'
0.267	 0.267
(0.026)	 (0.026)
0.346	 0.346
(0.033)	 (0.033)
0.267	 0.271
(0.028)	 (0.028)
1.095
	
1.026
155.60	 155.80
0.684	 0.683
0.000	 0.000
Table 18
Forgery 18, estimates of non-rejected models'
0.048
(0.660)
1.018
(0.098)
0.2469
(0.1015)
-0.0016
(0.0020)
-0.0051
(0.0123)
0.0024
(0.0132)
-0.0010
(0.0005)
0.0047
(0.0021)
0.263
(0.027)
0.344
(0.035)
0.267
(0.029))
0.999
152.36
0.699
0.030
56.2
(309)
21.9
(289)
-7.48
(90)
-3.20
(35)
14.7
(162)
108
(2989)
-0.70
(19)
-2.21
(61)
0.263
(0.027)
0.344
(0.035)
0.266
(0.027)
-1175
152.36
0.699
0.000
W3L2
-0.440
(2.983)
1.056
(0.322)
0.2503
(0.1346)
-0.0017
(0.0022)
-0.0048
(0.0129)
0.0227
(0.0111)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0'
0.264
(0.027)
0.341
(0.034)
0.266
(0.029)
1.025
155.46
0.684
0.000
Parameter W3L3 I 	W3L3I1
b
acolm2
axai
aX2X2
axix2
°Et
044
GE.
d
2c2
GFI
P
a See Table 2 for definition of mo dels. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a
second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
sign. Thus, we find our model framework to be rather successful for what is often
considered to be an expressive crime.
The standard errors of the estimates are as a whole slightly smaller for W213 than for
the other two models. Only the estimate of 0.2.2 is not statistically significant. The estimate
of the deterrence elasticity is negative and that of the the clear-up elasticity is positive, and
less than 1. The variance of both the crime and clear-up tendencies are decreasing during
the period studied, indicating a shrinking relative difference between police districts in both
respects. In the more parsimonious model W1L3 the estimate of b is of the same size as
in W2L3, but slightly less precise.
6.4.4. Offence against the personal liberty
Table 20 shows that the four non-rejected models for offence against personal liberty divide
into two groups: the estimates of W3L3 I, W3L2, and W3L1 are very similar to each other,
whereas those of W2L3 are more alike those of the rejected W3L3n. In the first group the
estimate of the clear-up elasticity is greater than 1, and in the other group smaller than 1.
In the first group the estimates of the deterrence elasticity is negative and (for two of the
models) statistically significant, whereas they in the second group are positive and non-
significant. In the former group the variances of both the crime and the clear-up tendencies
are decreasing during the period, indicating also for this type of crime a growing similarity
in relative terms between police districts.
6.4.5. Offence of violence against the person
Table 21 contains the estimates of two models, in addition to W3L3, applied to the offence
of violence against the person. The estimates of the parameters for W3L3 I, W2L3, and
W1L3 are very similar. Parsimony of parameters and slightly more precise estimates are
arguments for choosing W1L3. All, but one of the estimates are here statistically
significant, and of the expected sign. We find a strong deterrent effect of the probability
of clear-up. The variance of the crime tendency is constant by definition, and that of the
clear-up tendency is increasing. In the W3L3 I-model the variance of the crime tendency is
decreasing, indicating gradually more similar police district also with respect to this type
of crime.
6.4.6. Slander and libel
None of the models applied to slander and label seem to be appropriate, cf. Table 22. The
five non-rejected models have positive, but not statistically significant estimates of b, and
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Table 19
Sexual offence 19, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter
	 W3L3I
	 W3L3II	 W2L3	 W1L3
b	 -0397	 -7.71	 -0.495	 -0.419
(0.241 )	 (11.8)	 (0.214)	 (0.266)
r	 0.870	 -1.521	 0.933	 0.947
(0.199)	 (1.529)
	
(0.200)	 (0.248)
am.'
	
0.1939	 10.00	 0.1449	 0.1265
(0.0839	 (34.2)	 (0.0411)	 (0.0376)
aco2o32	 -0.0002	 03287	 -0.0015	 OC
(0.0019)	 (1.0270)	 (0.0010)
acolco2	 -0.0038 	4 .3034	 0`	 Oc
(0.0109)	 (4.1200)
aka'	 0.1682	 1.2324	 0.1828	 0.1807
(0.0633)
	 (1.7219)	 (0.0681)	 (0.0709)
°X2.2
	
0.0055
	 -0.0014	 0.0056	 0.0055
(0.0023)	 (0.0017)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0024)
°X1X2	 -0.0219	 -0.0495	 -0.0233	 -0.0225
(0.0104)	 (0.1046)
	
(0.0107)	 (0.0109)
0,E
	0.198	 0.198	 0.202	 0.195
(0.021)	 (0.021)	 (0.020)	 (0.019)
ao
	0.345	 0345	 0.354	 0345
(0.036)	 (0.036)	 (0.035)	 (0.033)
Gett,	 0.206	 0.206	 0.212	 0.204
(0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.022)
d	 0.952	 -18.44	 0.967	 0.978
X2 	138.21	 138.21	 138.67	 140.73
GFI	 0.682	 0.682	 0.687	 0.686
P	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a second order
equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
reasonable positive estimates of r. The most parsimonious model, W2L1, seems to be just
as good as the other four. A reason for the rather inconclusive results for this type of crime
might be that the offender has some interest in the slander being known, although not that
it should be cleared up by the police.
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Table 20
Offence against the personal liberty 21, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter	 W3L31
	 W3L3n	 W3L2	 W3L1	 W1L2
b	 -3.748	 2.146
	 -3.806	 -5.117	 0.755
(1.718)	 (1.744)	 (1.829)	 (2.770)	 (1.026)
r	 1.466	 0.733
	
1.479	 1.744	 0.822
(0379)	 (0.122)	 (0.408)	 (0.672)	 (0.110)
00,10,1	 1.1520	 0.4388	 1.1429	 2.2712	 03958
(1.0205)
	 (0.3045)	 (1.0394)	 (25280)	 (0.1809)
am22	 0.0011	 0.0060	 -0.0005	 0.0145	 0'
(0.0127)	 (0.0098)	 (0.0122)	 (0.0316)
acalco2	 -0.0755	 0.0149	 -0.0699	 -0.1993	 OC
(0.1031)	 (0.0366)	 (0.0992)	 (0.2775)
axixi	 0.0953	 0.0820	 0.1144	 0.2695	 0.0374
(0.1310)
	 (0.0478)
	
(0.1494)	 (0.3695)	 (0.0182)
a X.2Ä2	 0.0013	 0.0001	 0.0018	 Oc	 -0.0009
(0.0018)	 (0.0009)	 (0.0018)	 (0.0005)
axix2	 0.0032	 -0.0054	 0'	 0,	 0'
(0.0076)	 (0.0059)
ate	 0.188	 0.188	 0.186	 0.196	 0.203
(0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.023)	 (0.024)	 (0.024)
Go	0.251	 0.251	 0.252	 0.251	 0.274
(0.032)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)	 (0.033)
co	 0.151	 0.151	 0.150	 0.156	 0.168
(0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.024)	 (0.025)
d	 2.75	 1.57	 2.82	 2.81	 1.134
179.22	 179.22	 179.41	 181.73	 184.65
GFI	 0549	 0.549	 0.549	 0.537	 0.539
P	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a second
order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
C
 A priori restriction.
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Table 21
Offence of violence against the person 22, estimates of non-rejected
models'
Parameter
	 W3L31	 W3L3I1
	
W2L3	 W1L3
b	 -1.060
	
14.00	 -1.459	 -1.591
(0.593)	 (13.05)
	
(0.644)	 (0.569)
r	 1.072	 0.057	 1.103	 1.101
(0.067)	 (0.528)	 (0.071)	 (0.067)
amicoi	 0.2861	 4.1629	 0.2375	 0.2436
(0.0751)	 (73936)	 (0.0629)	 (0.0587)
Go)2032	 0.0016	 0.1654	 0.0003	 OC
(0.0011)	 (0.3103)	 (0.0009)
acok02	 -0.0113	 -0.4121	 Oc	 OC
(0.0073)	 (0.7991)
axim	 0.0213	 0.2545	 0.0234	 0.0237
(0.0081)	 (0.2730)	 (0.0084)	 (0.0084)
a X2A.2	 0.0008	 0.0014	 0.0009	 0.0009
(0.0003)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0003)	 (0.0003)
aa.a2	 -0.0021	 -0.0101	 -0.0023	 -0.0023
(0.0014)	 (0.0130)	 (0.0014)	 (0.0013)
at,	 0.079	 0.079
	 0.082	 0.082
(0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.007)
a44	 0.117	 0.117	 0.122	 0.124
(0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)	 (0.010)
ago	 0.085	 0.085	 0.084	 0.089
(0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)
d	 1.076	 14.2	 1.150	 1.161
7c2	 240.17
	 240.17	 243.11	 243.23
GF!
	0.594	 0.594	 0.601	 0.600
P	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a
second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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Table 22
Slander and libel 23, estimates of non-rejected modelsab
Parameter W3L3 1 	W3L3ll	 W2L3	 W1L3	 W2L21	 W2L1
b	 0.883	 -3.493	 0.610	 0.705	 0.201	 0327
(0.485)	 (2.972)	 (0.508)	 (0.533)	 (0.776)	 (0.983)
r	 0.714	 2.132	 0.824	 0.783	 1.026	 0.966
(0.244)	 (0.621)	 (0.274)	 (0.285)	 (0348)	 (0.432)
affilog	 0.1515	 3.5493	 0.2405	 0.2956	 0.2121	 0.2111
(0.1235)	 (5.4861)	 (0.0964)	 (0.1149)	 (0.0801)	 (0.0788)
Cleo2Q2 	-0.0014	 0.0480	 0.0020	 OC	 0.0027	 0.0028
(0.0038)	 (0.0861)	 (0.0024)	 (0.0021)	 (0.0024)
0.10,2	 0.0240	 -0.3172	 OC	 Oc	 OC	 Oc
(0.0216)	 (0.5577)
axixi	 0.2909	 0.1942	 0.2661	 0.2826	 0.1204	 0.1194
(0.1324)	 (0.2890)	 (0.1236)	 (0.1326)	 (0.0478)	 (0.0546)
ax2),2	 0.0039	 -0.0018	 0.0035	 -0.0041	 -0.0004	 OC
(0.0022)	 (0.0044)	 (0.0027)	 (0.0028)	 (0.0013)
akix.2	 -0.0260	 0.0307	 -0.0239	 -0.0268	 OC	 OC
(0.0159)	 (0.0253)	 (0.0158)	 (0.0163)
a.	 0.177	 0.177	 0.172	 0.175	 0.174	 0.174
(0.022)	 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.021)	 (0.021)	 (0.021)
04.4,	 0.290	 0.290	 0.290	 0.290	 0315	 0313
(0.037)	 (0.037)	 (0.037)	 (0.037)	 (0.038)	 (0.038)
ae.	 0.121	 0.121	 0.120	 0.122	 0.127	 0.127
(0.023)	 (0.023)
	 (0.022)	 (0.023)	 (0.023)	 (0.023)
d	 1.253
	
4.951
	 1.107
	
1.153
	
0.995	 1.011
X2 	123.04	 123.04	 124.45	 125.21	 128.89	 129.00
GFI	 0.649	 0.649	 0.641	 0.643	 0.640	 0.639
P	 0.024	 0.024	 0.023	 0.024	 0.014	 0.017
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a
second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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6.4.7. Embezzlement
In the case of embezzlement only two models satisfy our restrictions (16), cf Table 23. The
estimates are not very different from each other. We note, though, that W3L2 is the more
parsimonious one, and has a negative, but non-significant estimate of b. Both have first a
decreasing, and then an increasing variance of the crime tendency, whereas the variance
of the clear-up tendency is increasing for both. This indicates growing differences in
relative terms between police districts in both respects in the late seventies.
6.4.8. Fraud
Three models satisfy our restrictions (16) in the case of fraud, see Table 24. None of them
have statistically significant estimates of b. The one for W3L1 is negative, those for the
two others are positive. The variance of the crime tendency is mainly decreasing for all
three, with a slight increase at the end of the period. The variance of the clear-up tendency
is strongly decreasing. In both respects, then, the differences in relative terms between
police districts are reduced.
6.4.9. Offence inflicting damage to property
Only W3L3 I satisfy our restrictions in the case of offence inflicting damage to property.
For this solution the estimate of b is negative (see Table 11), but non-significant. The other
estimates have also expected signs, and most of them are statistically significant. The
variance of the crime tendency is decreasing, whereas that of the clear-up tendency is first
decreasing, and then increasing.
6.4.10. Aggravated larcenies
In the case of aggravated larcenies six models satisfy (16). Precision of estimates and
parsimony of parameters are arguments for choosing either W3L2 or W1L2 instead of
W3L3 I, cf Table 25. The high negative estimates of the deterrence elasticity indicate that
the clear-up probability has a substantial influence on this type of crime. The variance of
the crime tendency is decreasing and that of the clear-up tendency increasing for the
models allowing for changes in these tendencies. Police districts become less different with
respect to aggravated larcenies, and more different with respect to clearing up such crimes,
both in relative terms.
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Table 23
Embezzlement 24, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter	 W3L31
	 W3L3II	 W3L2
b	 0.055	 -10.21	 -0.223
(0.629)	 (7.284)	 (0.768)
r	 0.902	 19.1	 0.926
(0.070)	 (205)	 (0.098)
0.1.1	 0.3121	4.1829	 0.2986
(0.1269)	 (2.0581)	 (0.1197)
ac02a1.2	 0.0102	 0.0106	 0.0096
(0.0049)	 (0.0802)	 (0.0046)
owica	 -0.0355	 0.3963	 -0.0336
(0.0214)	 (0.6160)	 (0.0203)
axa.1	 -0.0113	 102	 0.0029
(0.0116)	 (2302)	 (0.0074)
ok22	 0.0001	 3.34	 0.0011
(0.0007)	 (75)	 (0.0005)
cra1)2	 0.0038	 -11.6	 Oc
(0.0025)	 (262)
O E 	0.232	 0.232	 0.233
(0.026)	 (0.026)	 (0.026)
00 	 .272	 0.272	 0.269
(0.030)	 (0.030)	 (0.030)
aeft)	 0.215	 0.215	 0.216
(0.026)
	 (0.026)	 (0.026)
d	 0.995	 186	 0.983
X2 	141.49	 141.49	 143.06
GF!
	0.641	 0.641	 0.642
P	 0.001	 0.001	 0.001
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the
two solutions of a second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
Table 24
Fraud 26, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter	 W3L3I	 W3L311	 W3L2	 W3L1
b	 0.200	 -26.23	 0.239	 -0.795
(0.758)
	 (31.4)	 (0.793)	 (2.162)
r	 0.962	 6.00	 0.961	 1.005
(0.046)	 (18.9)	 (0.047)	 (0.112)
0.1,01	 05249	 15.34	 0.5256	 0.5218
(0.141)	 (38)	 (0.1418)	 (0.1468)
0.2.2	 0.0075	 -03790	 0.0076	 0.0076
(0.0030)	 (0.9281)	 (0.0031)	 (0.0036)
amicca	 -0.0349	 0.4284	 -0.0348	 -0.0365
(0.0172)	 (1.8335)
	
(0.0172)	 (0.0195)
axixi	 0.0223	 13.10	 0.0260	 0.0194
(0.0152)	 (99)	 (0.0073)	 (0.0069)
C5Ä.212	 -0.0006	 0.1884	 -0.0004	 OC
(0.0004)	 (1.4249)
	
(0.0002)
CFX1X2	 0.0006	 -0.9707	 Oc	 Oc
(0.0023)	 (6.579)
a.	 0.194	 0.194	 0.194	 0.193
(0.018)	 (0.018)	 (0.018)	 (0.018)
00 	 .291	 0.291	 0.290	 0.286
(0.027)	 (0.027)	 (0.021)	 (0.026)
acs	 0.210	 0.210	 0.210	 0.208
(0.021)	 (0.021)	 (0.027)	 (0.021)
d	 0.992	 132	 0.991	 1.004
X2 	184.22	 184.22	 184.29	 18759
GFI	 0.674	 0.674	 0.673	 0.668
P	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a
second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
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Table 25
Aggravated larcenies 40, estimates of non-rejected modele
Para-.	 W3L31	 W3L3ll	 W3L2	 W3L1	 W1L3	 W2L21	 W1L2
meter
b	 -2.437	 2384	 -2.408	 -1.909	 -2.121	 -2363	 -2.007
(0.566)	 (2380)	 (0.497)	 (0.563)	 (1.007)	 (1.158)	 (0.797)
1.420
	 0.590	 1.397
	
1.065	 1.163	 1.285	 1.102
(0.419)	 (0.095)
	 (0353)	 (0.190)	 (0.491)	 (0.773)	 (0337)
Gm.,	 0.7338	 2.083	 0.7194	 0.5153	 03910	 0.4248	 03798
(03530)	 (2.0056)	 (03214)	 (0.1606)	 (0.1345)	 (0.2331)	 (0.1054)
ao2,„,	 0.0048	 0.0070	 0.0047	 0.0038	 Oc	 -0.0009	 OC
(0.0051)	 (0.0070)	 (0.0049)	 (0.0031)	 (0.0035)
a.k„,	 -0.0463	 -0.0032	 -0.0448	 -0.0258	 Oc	 OC	 Oc
(0.0388)	 (0.0294)	 (0.0361)	 (0.0187)
ax , x ,	 03665	 0.1235	 03433	 0.1381	 0.1799	 0.2562	 0.1446
(0.3960)	 (0.0404)	 (03142)	 (0.0940)	 (0.2819)	 (0.5688)	 (0.1696)
ax2x2 	0.0012	 0.0008	 0.0011	 Oc	 0.0009	 0.0013	 0.0008
(0.0015)	 (0.0007)	 (0.0012)	 (0.0010)	 (0.0023)	 (0.0006)
ax , x2
	-0.0006	 -0.0078	 Oc	 OC	 -0.0010	 Oc	 Oc
(0.0057)	 (0.0048)	 (0.0025)
ou	 0.054	 0.054	 0.054	 0.054	 0.056	 0.056	 0.056
(0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
a• 	0.198	 0.198	 0.198	 0.198	 0.206	 0.208	 0.206
(0.017)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)	 (0.017)
oes	 0.071	 0.071	 0.071	 0.070	 0.075	 0.076	 0.075
(0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)
d	 2.022	 1.977	 1.956
	
1.124	 1346	 1.673	 1.205
X2 	181.24	 181.24	 181.25	 185.74	 185.74	 187.01	 187.11
GF!
	0.670	 0.670	 0.670	 0.671	 0.671	 0.657	 0.656
P	 0.00	 0.000	 0.00	 0.000	 0.000	 0.071	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two solutions of a second
order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
C
 A priori restriction.
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Table 26
Simple larcenies 41, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter	 W3L3I	 W3L311
	
W3L2
b	 -1.072	 7.583	 -0.998
(0.193)	 (14.79)
	
(0.150)
r	 1.132	 0.067	 1.025
(0.257)	 (0.168)	 (0.167)
°cow	 0.3362	 16.62	 03544
(0.0945)	 (56.19)	 (0.087)
0.2.2
	0.0037	 0.1850	 0.0036
(0.0016)	 (0.6307)	 (0.0014)
amico2	 -0.0300	 -0.5025	 -0.0285
(0.0111)	 (1.6548)
	
(0.0102)
01.1k1	 0.2891	 03188	 0.2063
(0.1667)
	 (0.1182)	 (0.0864)
a A.2X2	 0.0032	 0.0032	 0.0022
(0.0020)	 (0.0016)	 (0.0011)
axim	 -0.0087	 -0.0261	 OC
(0.0088)
	 (0.0112)
cl.	 0.049	 0.049	 0.049
(0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)
as	0.122	 0.122	 0.122
(0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.011)
act	 0.044	 0.044	 0.043
(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)
d	 1.142	 8.07	 1.025
X2 	166.43	 166.43	 168.47
GFI	 0.724	 0.724	 0.722
P	 0.000	 0.000
	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the
two solutions of a second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b
 Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
Table 27
Thefts of motor vehicles 43, estimates of non-rejected models'
Parameter
	 W3L3"	 W3L3"	 W3L2	 W2L2I
b	 -2.679	 1.645	 -2.620	 -2.480
(0.472)	 (2.527)	 (0392)	 (0.532)
r	 1.608
	
0.627	 1.490	 1.222
(0.934)	 (0.066)	 (0.625)	 (0.509)
am.'
	
0.7264	 1.9321	 0.4524	 03035
(0.2054)	 (2.2664)	 (0.1849)	 (0.0997)
43co2co2	 0.0019	 0.0110	 0.0016	 -0.0010
(0.0038)	 (0.0135)	 (0.0034)	 (0.0020)
43010,2	 -0.0233	 -0.0255	 -0.0021	 OC
(0.0229)	 (0.0379)	 (0.0201)
oxiki	 0.7138	 0.0659	 0.5309	 0.2563
(1.3772)	 (0.0234)
	
(0.7758)	 (0.4246)
ak22 	0.0041	 0.0003	 0.0030	 0.0016
(0.0078)	 (0.0005)
	
(0.0043)	 (0.0023)
GX1A.2	 -0.0094	 -0.0032	 Oc	 OC
(0.0216)	 (0.0030)
0,2
	0.070	 0.070
	
0.071	 0.072
(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.006)
ow	0.134	 0.134	 0.134	 0.139
(0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)	 (0.012)
00	 0.074	 0.074	 0.074	 0.077
(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)
d	 2.629	 1.614	 2.284	 1.551
X'	 155.06	 155.06	 156.03	 157.34
GFI	 0.682	 0.682	 0.683	 0.684
P	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
a See Table 2 for definition of models. Solutions I and II correspond to the two
solutions of a second order equation obtained in identifying the model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
A priori restriction.
6.4.11. Simple larcenies
Two of the models applied to simple larcenies, W3L3 I and W3L2 are not rejected. Table
26 shows that their estimates are rather similar, and that those of the latter are statistically
significant, and somewhat more precise than those of the former. The estimates are
generally almost equal to those of crime at large. This is not surprising considered the large
proportion of total crime that consists of simple larcenies. In both models the variance of
the crime tendency is decreasing, and that of the clear-up tendency increasing. Both
tendencies are typical for most crimes: police districts become less different in crime
tendencies and more different in clear-up tendencies, still in relative terms.
6.4.12. Thefts of motor vehicles
Our study of thefts of motor vehicles has not been totally successful, as we for some
models have not been able to obtain optimal solutions by using LISREL. The three
estimated and non-rejected models of Table 27 exibit rather similar results. Precision and
significance of the estimates are arguments for choosing W2L2 I. Also for this type of crime
the clear-up proportion is found to have a strong negative influence on crime. Here, too,
we find a growing similarity in crime between police districts, whereas there is a growing
dissimilarity in clear-up.
7. Summing up
A new criminometric model is derived from a theory of criminal and police behaviour, and
measurement relations with random and systematic measurement errors. The effects of the
socioeconomic environment are summarized by the latent district effects in the crime and
clear-up functions, called crime and clear-up tendencies. The distribution of these latent
variables across police districts and over time is modelled.
The model has been successfully applied on panel data on the number of crimes and
clear-ups for the 53 police districts in Norway for 1970-78, confirming the hypothesis that
our approach is fruitful.
The model is not identified if the latent district effects are constant over time, but these
submodels are strongly rejected empirically, both for total crime and for 9 out of 12 types
of crime. In the general model there will be two observationally equivalent structures,  and
correspondingly two global maxima in the likelihood function, due to the two solutions of
a 2. order equation. However, by reasonable a priori restrictions on the parameter space,
only one of the two solutions come out as empirically relevant. It is remarkable that this
result was obtained both for total crime and for each of the 12 types of crime.
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In our analysis of total crime we find the deterrence elasticity to be significantly negative
and close to -1 in our preferred model. The estimate of this elasticity varies considerably
between submodels, and illustrates the importance of our systematic approach to
classifying, estimating, testing, and evaluating submodels.
Applying our most general model (W3L3) to 12 different types of crime, we find the
deterrence elasticity to be negative in seven cases, four of which significantly so. The five
positive estimates are mostly rather small and are all statistically non-significant. In three
of the five cases the estimates of the deterrence elasticity changes from being positive to
being (non-significant) negative, when going to more parsimonious models. Only in the
cases of public disorder, and slander and label the deterrence elasticity is found to be
positive for all non-rejected models. The clear-up probability has a rather strong negative
effect on crime for "simple" economic crimes, such as larcenies and thefts of motor
vehicles, whereas more "sofisticated" forms, such as fraud, embezzlement and forgery, are
less affected.
The estimate of the clear-up elasticity is for total crime expected to be positive, but less
than 1. Presumably, an increase in crime will cet. par. result in a proportionally less
increase in clear-ups. In our preferred model it is found to be 0.8. Also for various types
of crime we expect a positive estimate, but not necessarily less than 1. Reallocation of
police resources within a district might produce a proportionally higher number of clear-ups
than of crimes when a specific type of crime is increasing. The estimates are in accordance
with this expectation. They are all positive, and for some types of crimes and models they
are greater than 1, but not much so.
The variance of the log of the crime tendency for total crime is decreasing for all models
(in which a change is allowed) during the period. Except for embezzlement, and slander
and label this variance is for all models lower at the end of the period than at the
beginning, demonstrating a growing similarity in relative (log) terms among police districts
for most types of crime.
The estimates of the variance of the log of the clear-up tendency is increasing for total
crime and for half of the specific types of crime. In the remaing cases the development of
this tendency is less uniform. For nine of the 12 types of crime, however, our most general
model gives a higher variance at the end of the period than at the beginning, indicating a
growing dissimilarity among police districts as far as clear-up tendencies are concerned.
The more parsimonious models give, with a couple of exceptions, the same result.
The estimates of the variances and the covariance of the errors of measurement are all
significantly positive and very robust with respect to model specifications.
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Appendix: Data
This Appendix contains the covariance matrices of the logs of the number of crimes and
clear-ups for total crime and for 12 types of crime computed on the basis of data from 53
police districts in the period 1972-78. The data on the total number of crimes and clear-ups
has been provided by Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD). All remaining data
are unpublished statistics from Statistics Norway.
For convenience, the tables for the various types of crime have been numbered
according to the numbers given by Statistics Norway to these various types of crime:
A.13 Offences against public order and peace.
A.18 Forgery.
A.19 Sexual offences.
A.21 Offences against the personal liberty.
A.22 Offences of violence against the person.
A.23 Slander and libel.
A.24 Embezzlement.
A.26 Fraud and breach of trust.
A.28 Offences inflicting damage to property.
A.40 Aggravated larcenies.
A.41 Simple larcenies.
A.43 Thefts of motor vehicles.
A crime is registered by the police for statistical purposes in the year when the
investigation is closed. Accordingly, the statistics give information on investigated cases
and not about crimes committed in the statistical year. The average period of investigation
has for the country as a whole and for all crimes taken together increased from 4 months
in 1970-1972 to 4.9 months in the period 1980-1982. Cases shelved for observation are
considered closed, but if such cases are subsequently cleared up, a new statistical report is
submitted. If this happens the same year, the first report is not included in the statistics, but
if it happens in a subsequent year, the crime is registered as a separate crime and clear-up
that year.
The only noticeable legal change of some importance to the number of crimes
during the studied period, was the decriminalizing of "naskeri" (petty larceny of less than
about 50 kr.) by the end of 1972. Until then this crime was included in the group of petty
larceny, which accounted for about 30 per cent of total crimes. The number of crimes in
this group did not decline from 1972 to 1973.
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Table A.1
Covariance matrix of logs of crime rates
Crimes
Crimes
1970 1971	 1972 1973 	 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
1970 .4019
1971 .3614 .3695
1972 .3693 .3673 	 .3947
1973 .3714 .3718 	 .3912 .4187
1974 .3411 .3367 	 .3476 .3645 	 .3660
1975 .3390 .3402 	 .3524 .3689 	 .3505 .3836
1976 .3107 .3149 	 .3209 .3390 	 .3311 .3551 .3475
1977 .3001 .3070 	 .3143 .3324 	 .3151 .3351 .3240 .3331
1978 .2942 .2894 	 .2990 .3074 	 .2973 .3162 .2956 .3017 .3449
Table A.2
Covariance matrix of logs of crime and clear-up rates
Clear- Crimes
ups
1970 1971 	 1972 1973 	 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
1970 .2931 .2590 	 .2524 .2444 	 .2302 .2217 .2093 .1957 .1859
1971 .2525 .2622
	 .2430 .2441 	 .2144 .2143 .2010 .1918 .1727
1972 .2577 .2670 	 .2834 .2684 	 .2386 .2283 .2123 .2053 .1897
1973 .2506 .2713 	 .2762 .2962 	 .2458 .2526 .2344 .2242 .1931
1974 .2204 .2334 	 .2388 .2445 	 .2533 .2334 .2231 .1993 .1734
1975 .2117 .2205 	 .2313 .2374 	 .2222 .2539 .2321 .2056 .1827
1976 .2147 .2286 	 .2376 .2428
	
.2366 .2586 .2658 .2250 .1788
1977 .1882 .2062 	 .2135 .2231 	 .1911 .2075 .2085 .2231 .1758
1978 .1980 .1998 	 .2069 .1978 	 .1883 .1879 .1775 .1803 .2110
Table A.3
Covariance matrix of logs of clear-up rates
Clear- Clear-ups
ups
1970 1971 	 1972 1973 	 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
1970 .2746
1971 .2279 .2522
1972 .2165 .2219
	 .2754
1973 .1996 .2181 	 .2350 .2864
1974 .1796 .1850 	 .2117 .2210 	 .2512
1975 .1642 .1634 	 .1819 .1997 	 .1920 .2380
1976 .1766 .1706 	 .1969 .2074 	 .2031 .2060 .2837
1977 .1499 .1591 	 .1712 .1903 	 .1566 .1638 .1830 .2284
1978 .1672 .1554 	 .1872 .1605 	 .1440 .1387 .1582 .1529 .2244
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